Inequality and Growth in a Knowledge Economy by Kunal Dasgupta
University of Toronto 




Inequality and Growth in a Knowledge Economy





We develop a two sector growth model to understand the relation between
inequality and growth. Agents, who are endowed with different levels of knowl-
edge, select either into a retail or a manufacturing sector. Agents in the manufac-
turing sector match to carry out production. A by-product of production is cre-
ation of ideas that spill over to the retail sector and improve productivity, thereby
causing growth. Ideas are generated according to an idea production function that
takes the knowledge of all the agents in a ﬁrm as arguments. We go on to study
how an increase in the inequality of the knowledge distribution affects the growth
rate. A change in the distribution not only affects the occupational choice of
agents, but also the way agents match within the manufacturing sector. We show
that if the idea generation function is sufﬁciently convex, an increase in inequality
raises the growth rate of the economy.1 Introduction
HistorycreditsJamesWattwiththeinventionofthesteamengine, ThomasAlvaEdison
with the invention of the electric light bulb and Henry Ford with the invention of the
assembly line. But these great inventors did not work alone; they had very able partners
or teams assisting them in their endeavors. Watt had Matthew Boulton, Edison had
Charles W. Batchelor while Ford had C. Harold Wills among others. Whether Watt or
Edison or Ford would have been equally successful if they had worked on their own
is hard to conjecture. It is true, however, that the above mentioned partners and many
other individuals made signiﬁcant contributions to the various innovations that have
made Watt et al. household names.
In this paper, we develop a model to understand how the matching of agents within
ﬁrms affects growth through its impact on idea creation. Agents, in our model, are
distributed according to a fundamental knowledge distribution which we take as given.
Agents choose to work in either of the two sectors - retail or manufacturing. For the
latter, they also choose whether they want to be a worker or a manager. The sectors
vary in three important respects. Firstly, the manufacturing sector is more knowledge-
intensive. Secondly, agents match to carry out production in the manufacturing sector;
managers choose their workers. And ﬁnally, manufacturing ﬁrms also create new ideas
every period according to an exogenous idea production function. These ideas spill
over to the retail sector in the following period, thereby raising the total factor produc-
tivity of the retail sector ﬁrms.
An equilibrium in our model is characterized by two knowledge thresholds, where
the agents with knowledge below the lower threshold sort into the retail sector, while
those above the higher threshold become managers in the manufacturing sector. The
ones in between choose to be workers in manufacturing ﬁrms. The knowledge dis-
tribution not only determines the thresholds, but by affecting how agents match, also
determines the effectiveness and volume of ideas that are created. We go on to study
how an increase in the inequality of the knowledge distribution affects the growth rate.
A change in the distribution not only affects the occupational choice of agents, but also
the way they match within the manufacturing sector. The effect on the growth rate, of
course, depends on how ideas spill over.
We deﬁne a very general spillover function, which nests some of the more popular
spillover functions used in the literature. In the case of the canonical growth model,
which we brieﬂy review in Section 2, an increase in inequality is accompanied by
1a decline in the growth rate. If the growth rate is determined by the knowledge of
the best agents, as in Murphy et al. (1991), an increase in inequality could lead to a
higher growth rate. We show that whether an increase in inequality raises or lowers
the growth rate depends crucially on the elasticity of idea production with respect to
knowledge. A more unequal distribution has fewer managers (the allocation effect) but
they are, on average, more knowledgeable (the distribution effect). We show that if the
idea production function is sufﬁciently convex, the latter effect dominates the former,
leading to a rise in the growth rate.
The model is built on the presumption that the quality of ideas generated by a ﬁrm
depends on the knowledge of the ﬁrm’s employees. In a related paper, Lucas Jr (2009)
develops a model where the aggregate knowledge of an economy is simply a list of
the knowledge of its members. Like our model, a fundamental assumption of Lucas Jr
(2009) is that knowledge is embodied - “.....all knowledge resides in the head of some
individual person.....”. Lucas Jr (2009) does not, however, consider team formation or
the problem of allocating agents across sectors, as we do here. In our model, both the
allocation, as well as, the composition of ﬁrms matters for growth. In that respect, our
paper is similar to Murphy et al. (1991), who look at how allocating individuals with
different levels of knowledge across different activities can affect growth. Murphy et
al consider two main activities, production and rent-seeking, and consider the impli-
cations of allocating the most knowledgeable agents in either of these two activities.1
They, however, do not consider team formation. Since growth in their model is driven
by the productivity of the best production worker, inequality has no effect on growth
as long as the most knowledgeable agent in the economy is in the production sector.
This does not happen in our model since a change in inequality alters team formation,
thereby changing the quality of ideas that are being generated.
The ﬁrst generation of endogenous growth models predicted scale effects (See
Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). An increase
in the size of the population, by bringing about a proportionate increase in the number
of researchers, raises the growth rate of the economy. This prediction, however, is not
borne out by the data. Jones (1995) looks at the U.S. in the 20th century and ﬁnds that
the growth rate has been quite stable over this period. He interprets this as an absence
1Murphy et al. (1991), however, do not have an explicit dynamic model where the production and
rent-seeking sectors evolve endogenously. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) develop an endogenous growth model
where growth results from the interaction of two activities - accumulating physical capital which pro-
motes growth, and accumulating political capital, which promotes rent-seeking.
2of strong scale effects proposed by Romer and others, and in stead, proposes a model
with weak scale effects, where the growth rate of the economy depends on the growth
rate of the population and not on its level (See Jones, 1999). Similarly, Kortum (1997)
provides evidence that in the U.S., the steady increase in the number of researchers be-
tween the years 1910 and 1990 has not been accompanied by an increase in the number
of patents granted. He goes on to present a model, where steady-state growth is driven
by population growth, as in Jones (1999). This paper differs from the above-mentioned
papers in two important respects. Idea generation, in our model, is a by-product of pro-
duction and ﬁrms fail to capture the full value of their own ideas. We abstract from the
problem where ﬁrms optimally choose their level of research, (the ﬁrst difference) be-
cause we want to focus on the effect of the underlying knowledge distribution on idea
generation (the second difference). We believe that ours is the ﬁrst paper to explore
this issue.
Economists have been studying the relation between inequality and growth for a
long time. Thetraditional view was that inequality is goodfor growth. This could be ei-
ther because inequality generates incentives (the poor have an incentive to become rich)
or, because investment projects involve large indivisibilities or, because the rich have a
higher propensity to save compared to the poor (See Aghion et al., 1999).2 Recent stud-
ies have unambiguously shown that inequality retards growth.3 Accordingly, theories
have been forwarded that try to ﬁnd a causal link between inequality and growth. These
theories either emphasize the absence of well-functioning credit-markets (See, for ex-
ample Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997)
or introduce a political process through which agents choose the level of re-distribution
in the economy (See, for example Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini,
1994). None of these papers consider the effect of inequality on innovation or creation
of ideas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review
the canonical growth model and its treatment of inequality. In Section 3, we introduce
heterogeneity and matching. The equilibrium is characterized in Section 4. We deﬁne
inequality in Section 5, and examine how it affects growth in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2Kaldor (1955-56) believed that the propensity to save out of proﬁt income is higher than the propen-
sity to save out of wage income
3Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) among others, ﬁnd that
inequality lowers the growth rate. The latter also ﬁnd a positive effect of equality on growth.
32 A Canonical Growth Model
Let us consider a simple version of the endogenous growth model of Romer (1990).
The analysis is based on Jones (2005). The economy produces a homogeneous good




where At is the stock of ideas in the economy while LY;t is the amount of labor




where LA;t is the amount of labor employed in research at time t. For simplicity,
we assume that labor is the only factor of production. The total labor force is L and
there is no population growth. Therefore, the resource constraint of the economy is
LA;t + LY;t = L (3)
Suppose a fraction s of the labor force is allocated towards research (such a choice
can be derived from a micro-founded model where s would depend on preference and
institutional parameters), i.e.
LA;t = sL and LY;t = (1   s)L
Deﬁne the growth rate of per capita income yt(= Yt=L) as g. Then we have
g = log(yt+1)   log(yt)
= (log(At+1)   log(At))
= sL
The growth rate of per capita output is simply the growth rate of ideas, augmented
by  which measures the dependence of output on ideas - how a country grows essen-
tially depends on how ideas are generated in the country. g depends on the the total
number of workers in the economy. This is the standard scale effect in these kinds
4of models. A bigger population implies more researchers, which translates into faster
generation of ideas and hence, faster growth of output. A consequence of this is that
two countries with the same size of the labor force will grow at the same rate, other
things being the same.
It is clear that in the above model, inequality can affect growth rate only through s;
alltheotherparametersareexogenous. Aprioriwedonothaveanyideaofthedirection
of change in s following an increase in inequality. We do know, however, that an
increase in inequality can have a positive impact on the growth rate only by increasing
the number of researchers. In other words, if an increase in inequality leads to a decline
in s, growth rate of the economy goes down because there are fewer researchers in the
economy. Since researchers are homogeneous in terms of their research productivity,
only the mass of researchers matters for growth.
3 A model with heterogeneous agents
In this section, we lay out the basic economic environment of the model with hetero-
geneous agents.
3.1 Preferences and Endowments
Consider a closed economy. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents who
live for one period. Time is discrete. Each agent owns a certain amount of labor (same
across all agents), which he supplies inelastically. Since the measure of agents does not
play any role in our analysis, we normalize it to 1.
Agents are endowed with knowledge k which is distributed according to (k) with
support [k;k]: One can think of the knowledge distribution as being determined by
the government’s education policy. For our purpose, (k) is exogenously given and
is the same every period. Of course, over the long run, technological progress will
affect (k) by changing the occupational choice set of agents and thereby inﬂuencing
their educational decisions. Here, we abstract from the endogenous evolution of the
knowledge distribution.
53.2 Production and Occupation
The economy consists of two sectors - a retail sector and a manufacturing sector. The
retail sector produces a ﬁnal good Yt which is used for consumption. The manufactur-
ing sector produces differentiated intermediate inputs that are used in the production
of the ﬁnal good. Hence, we are following Romer (1990) in making the intermediate
input a differentiated good. The alternative, following Ethier (1982) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991), is to assume that agents have a love-for-variety utility function and
consequently, the ﬁnal good is differentiated. Although they produce identical results,
we go with the differentiated intermediate inputs assumption because it seems more
reasonable in the current context, as discussed below.
3.2.1 Retail sector








where At; as before, is the stock of ideas at time t, LY;t is the labor employed in
the retail sector, xt(k) is the amount of the differentiated input produced by a manager
with knowledge k and Mt is the set of agents who choose to be managers at time t. The
inputs could be goods that get used up in production or machines that depreciate fully.














The alternative form shows that the production technology in the retail sector ex-
hibits constant-returns-to-scale in labor and Xt, which is a CES aggregator of the dif-
ferentiated inputs xt(k).
Workers in the retail sector perform routine tasks. Hence, what matters for pro-
duction is the mass of workers rather than their knowledge. As a result, all workers in
this sector earn an uniform wage st: Furthermore, each manager is a monopolist and
sets a price of pt(k) for his inputs. Every period, a typical retail ﬁrm hires labor and
6purchases inputs in the spot market, carries out production and makes payment to the
factors which exhausts total output. Since the ﬁrm does not make any inter temporal al-














The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to labor gives rise to the following expression
for wage :







Moreinputs raises themarginalproductivityof theretailsectorworkers andthereby
increases the wage. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to input xt(k) yields the












Note that the only dependence of input price pt(k) on the aggregate knowledge
distribution is through the allocation of labor across the two sectors. In particular, it
does not depend on how much of the other inputs are being produced.
3.2.2 Manufacturing sector
Each intermediate ﬁrm consists of one manager/entrepreneur and one worker. Output
produced by each ﬁrm in a given time period is
xt(km) = kmk

w;  < 1 (8)
where the manager and worker’s knowledge are denoted by km and kw respec-
7tively.4 The production technology exhibits complementarity.  < 1 captures the fact
that output is relatively less sensitive to the worker’s knowledge. Therefore, unlike the
retail sector, the worker’s knowledge does matter for producing manufactured goods,
but it is relatively less important compared to the manager’s knowledge. This feature of
technology is essential for getting cross-matching of agents in the economy (See Kre-
mer and Maskin, 1996). The dependence of output on time arises from the possibility
that a manager might be matched with different workers in different time periods. We
also make the following assumption about the parameters:
Assumption 1 : k > 
1
k.
Assumption 1 is a statement about the range of the knowledge support with respect
to . The role of this condition - especially in ensuring the uniqueness and existence of
an equilibrium - will become clear later on. A manager hires a worker by paying wage
and is the residual claimant of total revenue. Although a manager is a monopolist in the
product market, he acts like a price-taker in the labor market. Accordingly, a manager
takes the wage schedule as given. The manager’s proﬁt is given by







w   wt(kw) (9)
where wt(k) is the wage schedule for workers in the manufacturing sector and we












At the margin, the increase in revenue coming from hiring a slightly more knowl-
edgeable worker should be equal to the increase in cost due to the higher wage that has











4Instead of the quantity of output depending on the knowledge of the agents, we could assume that
the quality of output is a function of knowledge. More knowledgeable agents produce better-quality
inputs. As long as we deﬁne xt(km) as quality adjusted inputs however, the above analysis remains
unchanged.
8It is clear that the slopes of the wage and proﬁt schedules are positive. Totally



































The numerator of the above RHS expression is positive (from the second-order






where mt(k) : [k;k] ! [k;k] is the equilibrium matching function. In equilibrium,
we have positive assortative matching (PAM) in the manufacturing sector. Note that
this result arises out of the optimization behavior of managers and does not, in any
way, depend on the shape of the knowledge distribution.
3.2.3 Occupational choice
By now, it should be clear that in each period, the agents face the following occupa-
tional choice :
 Being a worker in the retail sector
 Being a worker in the manufacturing sector
 Being a manager in the manufacturing sector
An agent chooses the occupation which generates the highest income, i.e. the prob-
lem facing an agent with knowledge k is
maxfst;wt(k);t(k)g: (12)







d(k)) = 1: (13)
where Wt denotes the set of workers in the manufacturing sector. Since manufac-





3.3 Evolution of Ideas
Every period, new ideas are generated within each manufacturing ﬁrm. Creation of
ideas is a by-product of manufacturing. We make the following two assumptions.
Firstly, new ideas add to the stock of existing ideas. Secondly, ﬁrms fail to internalize
the beneﬁt of developing ideas. The ﬁrst assumption rules out obsolescence of ideas.
The second is a consequence of the non-rival and non-excludable nature of ideas. Of
course, a ﬁrm developing an idea can, at times, use patents to exclude others from using
it. Here, we implicitly assume that the nature of the ideas is such that they can not be
patented. As a result, new ideas spillover to the rest of the economy. In particular, the
new ideas are absorbed by ﬁrms in the retail sector which in turn increases TFP in ﬁnal
good production, as is clear from equation (4).
We continue to assume that generation of ideas follows a log-linear technology, as
in equation (2), with the difference being that LA;t is now replaced by a function that
depends on the entire knowledge distribution through the matching of workers with
managers. As the distribution changes, the matches change too, thereby affecting the




where t : (k) ! <+ captures the exact form of the spillover. At this point, we do
not make any further assumptions about t and defer our discussion of t till Section
(??).
104 Equilibrium
Now that the basic structure of the model has been laid out, we are in a position to
deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium in this economy consists of the following objects :
(i) allocation of agents to different occupations,
(ii) time paths of retail sector wages and employment, fst;LY;tg1
t=0,
(iii) time paths of prices and quantities of differentiated inputs, fxt(k);pt(k)g1
t=0
 k2Mt,
(iv) time paths of manufacturing sector wage schedule, fwt(k)g1
t=0




(v) time path of the matching function in the manufacturing sector, fmt(k)g1
t=0,
(vi) law of motion for ideas fAtg1
t=0,
such that (a) agents maximize equation (12), (b) ﬁrms maximize equation (9), (c) labor
market clears and (d) ideas evolve according to equation (14).
4.1 Characterization of equilibrium
In the previous section, we had established that the manufacturing sector exhibits PAM.
The implication is that if we have an interval [k1;k2] of workers, then the correspond-
ing managers will lie in the interval [mt(k1);mt(k2)]; where mt(k1) > k2: There are
numerous allocations (inﬁnitely many) that are consistent with PAM. However, not all
of them are consistent with equilibrium, as shown in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the sets of workers in the retail sector are connected and is
of the form [k;k], where k is endogenous.
Proof In the appendix.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the sets of workers and managers in the manufacturing
sector are connected.
Proof See Dasgupta (2008).
Lemma 1 says that the least knowledgeable agents select into the retail sector. The
less knowledgeable agents have a comparative advantage in the retail sector which
is the relatively less knowledge-intensive sector. The intuition behind Lemma 2, on
11the other hand, is a bit more subtle. There are two opposing forces that determine
matching - complementarity, which encourages agents with similar knowledge levels
to match together and asymmetry, which goes in the opposite direction (See Kremer
and Maskin, 1996). Assumption 1 is a statement about the relative strengths of these
two forces.  captures the degree of asymmetry between the tasks of the worker and
the manager (A smaller  implies more asymmetry). Assumption 1 says that the degree
of asymmetry must be large enough. For example, if  = 1, the two tasks are perfectly
symmetric, and Assumption 1 is violated. In this case, the equilibrium outcome is
self-matching.
Lemmas 1 and 2 together imply that the equilibrium allocation is characterized by
two thresholds, k
t and k
t ; such that agents 2 [k;k
t] are in retail, agents 2 [k
t;k
t ] are
workers in manufacturing and agents 2 [k
t ;k] are managers in manufacturing. Figure
1 shows a possible equilibrium allocation.
Figure 1: An equilibrium allocation of agents
As shown in the ﬁgure above, the agent with knowledge k
t must be indifferent





One-to-one matching in the manufacturing sector implies that k














t is the median of the truncated distribution lying between k







t > 0. Henceforth, we drop the argument and write (k
t)
simply as t.









t  k  t: (16)
The LHS denotes the supply of workers in the interval [k
t;k] for some k. The RHS
denotes the demand for workers coming from managers in the corresponding interval
[t;mt(k)]. PAM implies that these two measures must be equal for every k. It is not
enough for the above equation to be satisﬁed only for k = t, as would be the case in a
standard Lucas span-of-control model without matching.







The above differential equation is intuitive. The numerator measures the density
of the workers with knowledge k, while the denominator measures the density of the
corresponding managers. Loosely speaking, if the numerator is small relative to the
denominator, the workers are more dispersed relative to the managers. Then mea-
sure consistency would require that workers with very different levels of knowledge be
matched with managers with very similar levels of knowledge. Consequently, mt(k)
increases slowly, i.e., the slope of the matching function is small.
For a given k




t ) = k to solve equation (17) and obtain the matching function mt(k): Replacing























Furthermore, the agent with knowledge t must be indifferent between being a
worker or a manager in the manufacturing sector, i.e. wt(t) = t(t). Replacing





























Greater employment in the retail sector affects wt(k
t) in two ways. Firstly, a higher
LY;t implies fewer agents in the manufacturing sector and accordingly, fewer potential
workers. Secondly, a higher LY;t raises the demand for intermediate inputs, thereby
making the occupation of a manager relatively more attractive and reducing the supply
of workers. This tends to shift up the entire wage schedule, resulting in a higher wt(k
t).
Solving for the equilibrium requires solving a ﬁxed-point problem. For a particular
value of At, the equilibrium can be solved by carrying out the following iterations :
1. Guess a value for k
t; which in turn determines LY;t (* LY;t = (k
t)).
2. Solve for mt(k) (The manufacturing sector has a block recursive structure which
allows us to solve for the matching function without any information on prices and
earnings. See Dasgupta (2008) for more on this).
3. Use equation (6) to solve for st.
4. Use equation (20) to solve for wt(k
t).
If st and wt(k
t) thus computed are equal, then we are done. Otherwise, we just
guess a different value for k
t and repeat steps 2-4. The following proposition shows
that such iterations necessarily converge.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists with thresholds k
t and t such that st = wt(k
t)
and wt(t) = t(t).
Proof In the appendix.
14Finally, the growth rate of the economy is given by
g = ln(Yt+1)   ln(Yt): (21)
This completes our characterization of the equilibrium.
4.2 Balanced Growth Path
Along a Balanced Growth Path (BGP), the growth rate of income is constant. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, given At, k
t is a sufﬁcient statistic for the equilibrium.
But k
t solves equation (15). Notice that At appears in the same form on both sides
of this equation. Consequently, at any point in time, k
t is independent of the level of
ideas in the economy. Intuitively, a higher At not only raises the retail sector wages, but
by raising the demand for intermediate inputs, also raises manufacturing wages. Since
At enters the production function of Yt multiplicatively, the increase in the two wages
cancel each other out, keeping the threshold unchanged. A constant threshold implies
that all the variables, including t, are also constant. Let this value of t be given by
. The growth rate is then given by equation (21),
g = ln(At+1)   ln(At)
= 

The economy is always on the BGP, growing at the rate . For the rest of the paper,
we drop the time subscripts on all the variables. A change in the distribution affects the
growth rate by changing . In the next section, we explore how a change in inequality
might impact the growth rate.
5 Inequality
How does a change in inequality in the knowledge distribution affect growth? A change
in (k) affects production and idea generation by changing how agents match. As the
nature of ideas spilling over to the retail sector change, the incentives of the agents
change too. This, in turn, affects the matches. To analyze the effect of inequality on
growth, we need to precisely deﬁne what we mean by an increase in inequality.
15Consider two distributions A(k) and B(k), which differ only in terms of the de-
gree of inequality. Let us assume that A(k) is more unequal than B(k) in the sense
of second-order stochastic dominance. Since we want to compare countries at the same
level of development, a mean-preserving spread seems like a more reasonable assump-
tion rather than some arbitrary difference in the two distributions. The only restriction
we impose on the shape of A(k) is that the distribution is downward-sloping, at least
in the upper tail. If we use earnings as proxy for knowledge, evidence would seem to
suggest that the knowledge distribution is indeed downward-sloping in the upper tail.
For analytical tractability, we consider marginal changes in inequality. In particular,
we choose t1;t2;s1;s2 as shown in the following diagram.
Figure 2: Second-order stochastic dominance
As indicated in Figure (2), the knowledge distribution in country B, B(k), is cre-
ated by making the following changes to A(k) :
B(k) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
A(k) +  for k 2 [k;t1]
A(k)    for k 2 [t1;t2]
A(k)    for k 2 [s1;s2]
A(k) +  for k 2 [s2;k]
(22)
B(k) is more unequal; it is a mean-preserving spread of A(k). The densities
are modiﬁed in a way so as to keep the two distributions identical over most of their
support.
The effect of higher inequality is asymmetric across the two sectors. Since knowl-
edge does not matter for production in the retail sector, there is no direct effect. The
manufacturing sector, on the other hand, is the knowledge-intensive sector. A higher
16inequality, as deﬁned above, implies that there are relatively fewer middle managers
under B (middle managers are the managers who run mid-sized ﬁrms, where size is
measured in terms of output). Since middle managers are scarce under B, their earnings
are higher relative to the more knowledgeable managers and manufacturing workers.
When inequality goes up, the manufacturing workers are made relatively worse-off,
forcing the least knowledgeable among them to switch to the retail sector. The fol-
lowing proposition shows the ﬁnal effect of a change in knowledge inequality on labor
allocation across the different occupations.
Proposition 2. A rise in inequality increases the threshold between the retail and the
manufacturing sector, k.
Proof In the appendix.
A corollary of the above proposition is that  rises as inequality increases. The
increase in inequality raises the average knowledge of the managers. PAM implies an
increase in demand for the more knowledgeable workers resulting in their wages going
up. Therefore, the opportunity cost of the least knowledgeable managers goes up, with
some of them switching occupation.
Corollary 1. A rise in inequality increases the knowledge of the best manufacturing
worker, .
6 Effect of an increase in Inequality on Growth
Recall from Section 4, that the steady-state growth rate is given by , which is an
aggregation of ideas. We deﬁne 









where i = fA;Bg. Ideas are generated by every manufacturing ﬁrm in the econ-
omy. I(k;m
 1
i (k)) is the idea-generation function, while !i(k) is a weight attached
to the idea produced by each ﬁrm. Every idea has two attributes - “effectiveness” and
“relevance”. Since ideas have no well-deﬁned units, we interpret I(k;m
 1
i (k)) as mea-
suring the effectiveness of ideas. The effectiveness of an idea measures the contribution
of the idea to total factor productivity, if there were no other ideas. There are, of course,
17lots of ideas in the economy. The relevance of an idea captures the relative importance
of the idea with respect to other ideas in the economy. We elaborate below.
The idea generated within a ﬁrm could depend not only on the manager’s knowl-
edge but could potentially depend on the worker’s knowledge too. Since we are in-
terested in how the manager’s and the worker’s knowledge affect 
i separately, we
assume that k and m
 1
i (k) enter I(k;m
 1









where a0(k) > 0, b0(m
 1
i (k))  0. Notice that if a0;b0 > 0, then the idea generation
function exhibits complementarity. In this case, team formation is going to determine
the effectiveness of ideas generated. To isolate the effects of this complementarity from
other distributional effects of a change in inequality, ﬁrst we consider the case where
the dependence of ideas on m 1(k) is suppressed.
6.1 Case where b(m 1
i (k)) = b
By setting b(m
 1
i (k)) equal to a constant, we make idea generation depend only on the
manager’s knowledge. Let us set b = 1. An increase in inequality, as deﬁned in the
Section 5.1, affects  through possible changes in , ! and . Recall that PhiB(k)
is the more unequal distribution. From Corollary (1), we know that  increases with a






























The terms Q and R deﬁned above capture the contribution of the managers with
18knowledge in [B;k]. These are the managers who operate under both distributions.
Furthermore, 
A has an additional component, denoted by P in equation (24). P cap-
tures the contribution of managers who operate under A but switch occupation under
B. Notice that the difference between Q and R arises due to a difference in the den-
sities and the !s. If all ideas are equally relevant, i.e., if !i(k) = 1 for all k, the effect
of inequality on growth depends only on the shape of a(k). A particularly simple case
is the one where a(k) is equal to a constant.








= a(1   i(i))
The growth rate depends only on the fraction of managers in the economy (or the
mass of managers since we have set population to 1). According to equation (22),
A(A) = B(A). Corollary (1) then implies that A(A) < B(B). Therefore, the
more unequal distribution has fewer managers and consequently, lower growth. 5 This
result is similar to the one obtained in Section 2, where growth rate was a function of
the size of the population.
This result might seem surprising, given that the average knowledge of the man-
agers in the unequal distribution is higher. In this particular case, however, knowledge
of the managers does not really matter for idea generation because more ideas get equal
weight.6 Although a more unequal knowledge distribution has managers who are, on
average, more knowledgeable, the more knowledgeable managers actually drive out
the less knowledgeable managers (in this model, the latter become workers) with the
5An alternative way to get the same conclusion is to assume that new ideas arrive in ﬁrms at the
Poisson rate p. Ideas have the same effectiveness and hence, carry the same weight. This has been a
standard assumption in the existing literature with homogeneous ﬁrms. What matters, then, is the total
number of ideas. The Law of Large Numbers implies that in any period, the mass of ﬁrms which generate
new ideas is pM, where M is the steady-state mass of ﬁrms (or managers). Therefore, the growth rate
must be equal to pM.
6A possible interpretation is that each ﬁrm generates an idea that is very different from other ideas.
For example, one idea could be about more efﬁcient organization of the workspace while another could
be about streamlining supply chains. A third could be about the optimal location of stores. Each of these
ideas could be generated by different ﬁrms. Furthermore, each of these ideas could have similar impact
on the productivity of other ﬁrms in the economy.
19result that there are fewer managers in equilibrium.
Ideas may not, however, be equally relevant. Suppose managers with similar levels
of knowledge also produce similar ideas.7 In this case, how relevant an idea is could
depend on the distribution of knowledge. This is due to the “ﬁshing in the pond”
effect. If we believe that there is a set of ideas that is given and invention or innovation
amounts to discovery of such ideas, then generation of ideas independently by many
ﬁrms would involve lots of duplications. In other words, having many ﬁrms run by
very knowledgeable managers may not necessarily lead to high growth because the
ﬁrms could generate ideas that are very similar.8 Hence, ideas generated by managers
who are more abundant would be less relevant. The following example illustrates our
point.
Example 2 (Jacobs’ view of spillovers) : Setting !i(k)) = 1








The growth rate depends on the un-weighted sum of ideas generated in the econ-
omy. The distribution of managers does not matter. Any change in densities, brought
about by a change in inequality, is nulliﬁed by the changing weights. The justiﬁcation
is as above. Firms in a particular industry generate ideas that are similar in nature.
Naturally, the more ﬁrms there are in an industry, the more duplication there will be.







A a(k)dk. This expression will be negative as long as a(k)  0
for k 2 [A;B]. Without loss of generality, let us assume that a(k) = 1 8k. Then
 = k    = [;k] where  is the Lebesgue measure. An increase in inequality, by
reducing [;k], reduces the growth rate.
Greater diversity in the manufacturing sector leads to the creation of more ideas.
This is the view forwarded by urban planner Jane Jacobs (Jacobs, 1970). According to
Jacobs, ideasaretransmittedthroughtheinteractionofindividualsandthemorediverse
the industries, the better the ideas.9 Accordingly, a city like New York would grow
7This is not unreasonable because each level of knowledge corresponds to a differentiated product.
8An additional unit of an intermediate good has a positive marginal product, even if this unit is
identical to other units. The same is not true for ideas.
9Of course, Jacobs’ view of the spillover of ideas had a spatial dimension. Jacobs was thinking of
diversity of industries concentrated in a geographical area. Although there is no space in our model, one
20faster because of the diversity in the local industries compared to a city like Detroit,
which is dominated by one industry.10
In the above example, ideas were similar within industries but different across in-
dustries. It is possible, however, that ideas overlap across industries too. Imagine that
an idea consists of a set of mini-ideas. Then the aggregate idea in the economy is the
union of all such sets. Now, if the idea set corresponding to manager k1 is a subset of
the idea set corresponding to manager k2, then the idea of k1 is completely irrelevant;
the idea of k2 is, in some sense, at least as good as that of k1. An extreme case of such
overlaps in ideas is considered below. Example 3 (Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny (1990) :





0 8k < k
1 if k = k




Although every manufacturing ﬁrm in the economy produces new ideas, only the
best idea spills over to the retail sector. If we assume that all (or most) the ideas
generated in the manufacturing sector pertain to making the production of the ﬁnal
good more cost-effective, then the idea that leads to the greatest reduction in cost are
adopted by the retail sector; the best practice in period t becomes the standard in period
t + 1. If we believe that the most effective ideas are generated by the most productive
ﬁrms in the economy (i.e. a0 > 0), the knowledge of the managers of those ﬁrm
becomes important for growth.
This is similar to Murphy et al. (1991), where the growth rate is determined by the
knowledge of the most knowledgeable entrepreneur in the economy. In their model,
if the parameters are such that the best agents become entrepreneurs, the growth rate
would correspond to the knowledge of the most knowledgeable agent in the economy.
In our model, as in Murphy et al. (1991), an increase in inequality does not change the
can think of the manufacturing industries as being located in one “industrial hub”.
10This is in contrast to the MAR view (named after its proponents - Alfred Marshall, Kenneth Arrow
and Paul Romer) which states that the more concentrated employment is in one industry, the greater are
the knowledge spillovers.
21identity of the best manager in the economy, because comparative advantage implies
that the most knowledgeable agents always select into being managers. But, although
the identity of the most knowledgeable manager remains unchanged, higher inequality
implies that there are more of them. Consequently, a change in inequality raises the
growth rate.
The examples presented above suggest that when the effectiveness of ideas depends
only on the knowledge of the manager, the weight attached to the ideas will determine
whether an increase in inequality causes the growth rate to fall (as in Example 2), or
remain unchanged, or rise (Example 3). Going back to equations (24) and (25), we
see that the increase in inequality affects growth through two effects - (i) a distribu-
tion effect, captured by Q   R and (ii) an allocation effect, captured by P. When
b(m 1(k)) = 1, a change in the knowledge distribution has no impact on the effec-
tiveness of ideas generated by any manager. The densities, on the other hand, change.
In particular, conditional on being truncated at B, B ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates
A. Therefore, if the weights are held constant, we would have Q   R < 0, that is the
distribution effect of an increase in inequality is positive.11 At the same time, since a
rise in inequality leads the least-knowledgeable managers to switch occupations, some
ideas are lost. Therefore, the composition effect is always negative, provided that the
weights attached to the ideas generated by the less knowledgeable managers are pos-
itive. Hence, the ﬁnal impact will depend on which effect dominates. If the !s are
such that they nullify the effects of a change in the distribution, the composition effect
dominates, as in Example 2.
If ! is constant across distributions, but non-decreasing in knowledge, the effect
of !(k) and a(k) are not separately identiﬁable. Then we can simply deﬁne ^ a(k) =
!(k)a(k), where ^ a  0. Observe, that the marginal increase in R   Q will be greater,
the more convex ^ a is for k 2 [B;k]. At the same time, P will be small if ^ a is small
over the relevant range. Combining the two observations, we can infer that if ^ a is
sufﬁcientlyconvex, thedistributioneffect dominatesandthegrowthraterisesfollowing
an increase in inequality. An extreme form of this convexity is illustrated in Example
3. If, however, ^ a is sufﬁciently ﬂat, the allocation effect dominates. This is shown in
Example 1, where ^ a = 1. We can summarize the above discussion in the following
proposition :
11This follows from the deﬁnition of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
22Proposition 3. When b(m 1(k)) = 1, an increase in inequality leads to higher growth
if !(k)a(k) is increasing and sufﬁciently convex.
A convex !(k)a(k) function implies that ideas generated by more knowledgeable
managers are either more effective, or more important, or both. Therefore, although
an increase in inequality reduces the mass of managers, the loss of ideas is small com-
pared to the improvement in ideas coming from managers who are, on average, more
knowledgeable than before.
6.2 Complementarity in idea generation
Next we consider the case where b(m
 1
i (k)) is no longer a constant. For simplicity,
let us assume that !i(k) = !(k), where !(k) is non-decreasing. Hence, as in the
previous subsection, we can deﬁne ^ a(k) = !(k)a(k). In this case, a change in the
distribution not only affects i(k) but also m
 1
i (k). In order to analyze the effect of a
mean-preserving spread on matching, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 3. With an increase in inequality, the match of the manager with knowledge




Proof In the appendix.
We know that m
 1
A (k) < m
 1
B (k). With an increase in inequality, the inverse
matching function becomes steeper for lower values of k but eventually ﬂattens out.
Combined with Lemma (3), this implies that there is a set E  [B;k], such that
m
 1
A (k) > m
 1
B (k) for k 2 E and m
 1
A (k) < m
 1
B (k) for k 2 Ec. This is illustrated in
Figure (3).
The above ﬁgure suggests that the distribution effect deﬁned earlier is no longer un-
ambiguously positive. Following a rise in inequality, some of the surviving managers
have better matches, but there are some managers who are matched with less knowl-
edgeable workers than before. Of course, how this affects idea generation in each ﬁrm
and consequently in the aggregate will depend on b(:). If b0 is small (idea generation is
not very sensitive to the knowledge of the worker), the distribution effect continues to
be positive. In fact, as long as b(:) is sufﬁciently convex, the distribution effect is not
only positive, but it also dominates the negative allocation effect. The intuition is very
similar to the one offered in the previous subsection. A convex b(:) re-enforces the ef-
fect of a shift in the mass towards more knowledgeable managers. The improvement in
23Figure 3: The m 1(k) function under the two distributions
ideas coming from the more knowledgeable managers is much bigger compared to the
decrease in effectiveness of ideas arising from the worsening of some matches. This
allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If !(k) is independent across distributions, an increase in inequality
will raise the growth rate if either (i) ^ a(k) is sufﬁciently convex and b(k) is not too




function for ideas increases sufﬁciently quickly with knowledge, fatter tails would lead
to more (effective) ideas by the surviving managers. This is not only because marginal
effectiveness of ideas goes up with the manager’s knowledge, but also because the
bettermanagersarematchedwithbetterworkers. Foranunchangedknowledgesupport
for the managers, this results in more effective ideas on the aggregate. But a change
in inequality affects the allocation of agents across occupations, which in turn means
fewer ideas. The effect on the growth rate depends on whether having relatively more
knowledgeable managers can compensate for having fewer managers.
It should be noted, that the mechanism (through which inequality affects growth)
that we have highlighted here has a fundamental difference with what has been pro-
24posed in the existing literature on growth and inequality. In the existing literature,
inequality affects growth primarily through its impact on the poorer sections of the so-
ciety. For example, in the presence of credit market imperfections, inequality could
affect investment by limiting the opportunities of poor individuals. In other words, the
lower tail of the income distribution would matter for growth. On the contrary, in our
model, growth depends primarily on what is happening at the upper tail of the distri-
bution. That is because, growth is driven by ideas which are created in the knowledge-
intensive sector of the economy. The less knowledgeable agents (usually the poor) in
the economy sort into the retail sector which beneﬁts from the spillover but does not
generate any. A change in the distribution of agents working in the retail sector has no
direct impact on growth, because it does not change the way ideas are created.
7 Conclusion
Neo-Classical growth theory has come a long way since the seminal work of Robert
Solow (Solow, 1956). Economists have studied the relation between the rate of growth
of a country and a myriad phenomena, including innovation, migration, corruption and
pollution, to name just a few. Although it has received some attention, the interaction
between inequality and growth is far from being well-understood (See Helpman, 2004,
Chapter 6 for a non-technical summary of the relevant issues).
The recent empirical literature on growth and inequality, surveyed well by Benabou
(1996), ﬁnds a clear negative correlation between income inequality and GDP growth
across countries. The direction of causality is, however, much less clear. In this paper,
we take a position on causality and proceed to analyze the nature of this causality, being
fully aware of the fact that there could be reverse causality. We take the distribution of
knowledge in the population as given and go on to examine the implications of a mean-
preserving spread of this distribution on the the growth rate of the economy. Since
the knowledge distribution of a country maps into an income distribution, our model
generates an indirect link between income distribution and the growth rate of a country.
Of course, the knowledge distribution itself is, to a certain extent, determined by the
wealth distribution of a country. This is even more true when credit markets are im-
perfect.12 Our focus on the knowledge distribution, rather than the wealth distribution,
12Borrowing against future human capital is difﬁcult due to the embodied nature of human capital
REF
25stems from our belief that the effectiveness of productive ideas ultimately depends on
the knowledge of the agents engaged in the generation of those ideas. Then a change
in the distribution affects the growth rate, both by changing the occupational choice of
agents and the matching between agents across ﬁrms.
The process through which ideas are created is treated as a black box in our model.
Since our aim was to understand the relation between knowledge inequality and the
aggregate growth rate, we have abstracted from explicitly modeling the mechanism
through which managers and workers get together in organizations to create new ideas.
The matches, in our model, are determined solely on the basis of the production re-
lation. A more complete treatment would require micro-founding the idea generation
function. In such a model, the manager would be deciding not only how much output to
produce but also how much to invest in research and development. The manager would
be choosing how to allocate agents across tasks (production and idea-generation) in
order to maximize some proﬁt function. In this respect, the framework developed in
Garicano (2000) could be useful. We leave the development of such a model for future
work.
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28Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : Suppose that, on the contrary, we have the following allocation:
[k1;k2] 2 retail, [k2;k3] 2 manufacturing, [k3;k4] 2 retail. Then both k2 and
k3 must be earning wY;t, since both of them are indifferent between being in retail or
manufacturing. If k2 chooses to be a worker, then wt(k2) = st. Otherwise, t(k2) = st.
Either way, since w0
t(k) > 0 and 0
t(k) > 0, k3 must be earning more than k2 and
consequently, more than st. A contradiction.
To show that the least knowledgeable agents are in retail, suppose that, on the con-
trary, [k;k1] 2 manufacturing, [k1;k2] 2 retail. Without loss of generality, suppose
that k1 is a worker in the manufacturing sector. Consider the agent with knowledge
k1 + , where   ! 0. Since he is in retail, he must be earning st. However, if he
moves to sector I as a worker, he can earn wt(k1 +) > wt(k1) = st, since w0
t(k1) > 0.
Therefore, this allocation can not be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1 : Deﬁne (k
t) = wt(k
t)   st, where st is given by equation
(6). Differentiating wt(k
















































































to be positive is 2k > 
1
k; which is ensured by Assumption 1. It is straightforward
to show that @st
@k




t > 0. Furthermore, when k
t = k, LY;t = 0.
Therefore, (k
t)jk
t =k =  1. And when k
t = k, (k
t)jk




Applying the intermediate value theorem, 9k
t such that (k
t) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 : Suppose, on the contrary, the threshold between the retail
and the manufacturing sector remains unchanged following a rise in inequality, i.e.
k
A = k
B = k. Then, A(k) = B(k). Since the density between k
A and A is the
























We also know that, B(s1) < A(s1). Therefore, at m
 1





































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from deﬁnition and the second inequality follows
from the assumption that density is decreasing in knowledge. It follows that












A(). Therefore, in an    ball around , mB(k) > mA(k). In fact, using a similar
logic as above, it can be shown that
mB(k) > mA(k) 8k 2 [m
 1
B (s2);] (iii)
Combining equations (i), (ii) and (iii), we see that 9S 2 [k;], s.t.
mB(k) > mA(k) 8k 2 S
mB(k) = mA(k) otherwise
Using the result that matches weakly improve with inequality in equation (6), we














i.e. output produced can be attributed either to the worker or the manager. Since













































































It follows that s increases as inequality goes up. Thus, as we move from A to B,
if we hold the threshold k constant, w(k) goes down while s goes up. Therefore,
at k = k, w(k) < s. This can not be an equilibrium. Hence, the thresholds must
change. In particular, under B; there is an excess demand for workers in the retail
sector if the threshold is at k
A. Hence, workers move from manufacturing to the retail
sector, resulting in k moving to the right. The conditions on the parameters ensure
that s   w(k) falls as k rises. In equilibrium, k
B > k
A.
Proof of Lemma 3 : From Proposition (2), we know that B > A. By deﬁnition,
A(B)   A(A) = A(m
 1
A (B))   A(k
A). Also, A(m
 1




A (B))   B(k
A). Let us consider the following two scenarios. In scenario
one, s1 in Figure (2) is greater than B. Then, we must have B(B)   B(A) =
A(B) A(A). In scenario two, s1 is less than B. In this case, B(B) B(A) <
A(B)   A(A). Combining the two, we have B(B)   B(A)  A(B)  
A(A). Therefore, B(B)   B(A)  B(m
 1
A (B))   B(k
A). It follows that
m
 1
B (B) = k
B  m
 1
A (B).
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